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ABSTRACT 
The problems associated vrith "the implementr t i on of national 
development plans in the developing: world have become a major concern 
to both development analysts and practitioners. Various approaches 
in systems management have therefore been suggested to invigorate and 
rationalise the plan implementation.process. This tempts to 
assess the applicability of various systems management techniques to 
the development administration process in Kenya. The limits which 
uncertainty imposes on general development policy are used as a point 
of departure. The ubiquity of uncertainty is seen as militating 
against the introduction of systems procedures and as necessitating 
the adoption of unprogrammed, ad hoc, and flexible administrative 
techniques. The oase is therefore made for the adoption of this 
unprogrammed approach to plan implementation as opposed to the system 
management procedures. 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the foremost lessons to emerge from the experience of the 
first development decade was the practical need for plan implementation 
over formal plan formulation. The re-orientation arising from this 
experience is now evident in the increasing emphasis on the appropriate 
mechanisms for execution of development programs now coming from inter-
national development agencies, governments and academics„ The symposium 
of the international planning experts which met at Sussex University in 
1969 to discuss the "crisis in planning" produced basic consensus on the 
need for rethinking and restructuring of plan implementation machinery*' 
Successful project implementation has now become the catchword in the 
development planning literatures In the African context, this trend 
is highlighted by G.K. Helleiner's proposal that planning in the 1970's 
2 
must go "beyond growth rates and plan volumes". Most of the new plan 
volumes stress the same inclination,, 
On the principle that complex problems call for sophisticated 
solutions, we have witnessed a succession of supposedly rational, 
comprehensive, omniscient, systems-oriented techniques borrowed from 
the frontiers of management science and intended to invigorate the 
plan implementation process. At the close of the development decade 
itself, Easman and Montgomery, who had been involved in US technical 
assistance, were advocating the "systems approach" to plan execution 
in view of its "overall detailed identification of interrelated factors 
in a complex system of action; precise time phasing of related activities 
and control operations through the use of modern high speed communication 
and reporting instruments". Later, and in what appears to be a pioneering 
lc The proceedings are published as The Crisis in Flanning 2 Vols., 
edited by Michael Paber & Dudley Seers (Sussex University Press, 
1972)= 
2. GoIC. Helleiner, "Beyond Growth Rates and Plan Voiumes - Planning in 
Africa in the 1970's", Journal of Modern Africa.! Studies Vole 10, 
Ho. 3, 1972 pp 333-55» See also Gerald M. Meier, "The Development 
Decade in Perspective" in R. Robinson (ed) Developing the Third 
Ho rid (London, Cambridge University Press, 1971)» 
3c M J . Easman and J.D Montgomery, "Systems Approaches to Technical 
Co-operation: The role of development administration", Public 
Administration Review Vol. 29 Ho. 5, 19^9» p. 518. 
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text,Earl M. Kulp developed a lengthy systems model for rural plan 
4 implementat ion. 
The Kenya government among others has enthusiastically espoused 
the new management techniques to rectify the conventional inadequacies 
in development administration,, The now famous Ndegua Commission on the 
public service structure recommended the adoption of Management by 
Objectives (MBO) and Organisational Development (OD) techniques in the 
public service. Further, where field administration for development 
concerned, the Commission recommended a systems management approach to 
development program implementation., To this effect a Los Angeles manage-
ment consultancy outfit was hired to draft a systems management blue-
print for implementation purposes,, Currently, the Kenyan Ministry of 
finance and Planning is engaged in introducing another systems variant; 
Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS). 
The proclivity for a programmed or systemic style of problem solving, 
however, is most pronounced in the progress of the Special Rural Develop-
ment Programme (SRDP) which was initiated by the Kenya government in 
1970. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance and Planning, Deryke 
Belsh^w and Robert Chambers, then at the University of Nairobi, together 
g 
developed a systems framework for the management of rural developmentc 
The framework attempts to comprehend rural development activity under 
six basic procedural systems amply illustrated with multicolored box 
diagrams and seventeen exotic abbreviations. Of the six procedures PIM 
(Programming and Implementation Management) has been in operation in the 
SRDP areas since mid- 1971° 
4. Earl M . Kulp, Rural Development Planning: Systems Analysis pnf! Working 
Methods (New York, Praeger, 1970). See also 3eor~e Char
1
 wink A 
Systems View of Planning (Oxford, Pergamon Press, 197l)„ 
5. Republic of Kenya, Report on the Commission of Inquiry: Public 
Service structure and Remuneration Commission. Chairman D.N. 
Ndegwa (Nairobi, Government Printer, 1971). 
6. Deryke Belshaw and Robert Chambers, A Management Systems Approach to 
Rural Development, (Nairobi, IDS Discussion Paper
 T
o. 161) and PIM;' 
A Practical Management System for Implementing Rural Development 
(IDS Discussion paper No. 162).Another attempt to formulate, a 
systematic, procedural approach to the SRDP implementation is the 
"functional model" given in An Overall Evaluation of the SRDP (Nairobi, 
IDS, 1972) p. 11. 
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This paper attempts to assess the appropriateness of the various 
approaches of systems programming in the plan implementation process
0 
The limits which uncertainty imposes on general development policy are 
used as a point of departure. Subsequently, the process of development 
administration in Kenya is used to illustrate the kind of administrative 
behaviour which results from this. The latter section of the paper attempts 
to fathom the logic underlying such behaviour, while at the same time, it 
makes suggestions by which the latent advantages in the process can be 
harnessed toward better plan implementation. 
UNCERTAINTY AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY. 
At the minimum any model of perfect programmed policy execution 
calls for a rare degree of certainty, a situation in which the precise 
distribution of probabilities is known. Thus, first the exact causal 
relationship between the policy and the consequences of its implementation 
must be known. Prom this the appropriate operational activities can be 
deduced. Secondly, the behaviour of exogenous variables must be either 
accurately predictable or at least constant. If conditions are otherwise, 
then the operating agency will be compelled to adapt to unpredictable 
environmental change by deviating from programmed procedures or even by 
goal alteration. Yet, ironically it is for situations which contravene 
these basic preconditions that programmed implementation procedures are 
prescribed. For in the prevailing state of affairs, development projects 
are implemented with many uncertainties surrounding policy outcome and, 
in addition, with the possiblility that any number of environmental 
variables might intervene. The situation is best epitomised by Wolfgang 
7 
Stolper as planning under "comprehensive uncertainty." 
Uncertainties surrounding the probabilities of development policy 
oiitcomes are seldom analysed. Although our knowledge of development 
economics has certainly increased over the last two decades, we are no-
where close to accurately predicting relationships between policy and 
7. Wolfgang Stolper, "The Limits of comprehensive planning under 
comprehensive uncertainty", University of Michigan, Center for 
Research in Economic Development, (Discussion paper No. 10) 
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outcomeo As Tinbergen himself argues, "we simply do not know many of the 
causes leading to the development of a country with the result that a 
g 
conscious development policy cannot be chosen with certainty". In fact, 
the development literature itself is a welter of contradictory hypotheses 
and periodical re-orientations of emphasis, E^om Ragnar Nurkses's original 
stress on the primacy of capital formation we have come across an almost 
limitless range of policy prescriptions for development: industrialisation; 
entrepreneurial development; social and cultural change; "human investment"; 
export diversification; intermediate technology.; planning; decentralised 
planning; rural development; stable polities, etc. The recent ILO report 
on Employment, Incomes and Equality in Kenya flouts a good deal of — Q 
hitherto conventional beliefs on development policy
0
 Thus the "informal 
sector" is now seen as a more potent employment and income generator 
than the formal capitalist and public sector; import substitution industri-
alisation policy is seriously challenged; small scale business and agricultu-
ral units are. found to be more productive and efficient than the larger 
enterprises. Over time then, the policies itfhose implementation is said 
to lead to development have come to span almost the entire range of human 
behaviour - a situation summed up by Caiden and Wildavsky to mean, "do 
everything and do it at once"»^ 
The incidence of the second type of uncertainty — that pertaining 
to the environment-is not difficult to catalogue. One need look no further 
than the contemporary newspaper headlines. First, there is the category 
of unavoidable natural disasters like drought and flooding. Environ-
mental uncertainty can a l s o stem from the "dependency" or neo-colonial 
8. Jan Tinbergen, Development Planning (London, Weidenfield and Nicholson, 
1967) p. 28. 
9. International Labour Office, Employment, Incomes and Equality 
(Geneva, 1972) Hereafter, The ILO Report. 
10. Naomi Caiden and Aaron Wildavsky, Planning and Budgeting in Low 
Income Countries (forthcoming 20th Century Fund Study). 
economic relationships "between the industrialised countries and the 
"periphery", fluctuating primary commodity prices, deteriorating terms 
of trade, "imported" inflation, monetary instability in the capitalist 
world prompting devaluations and revaluations of reserve currencies. 
Lastly, uncertainty could also arise from the volatile nature of urder-
developed societies and polities. All these factors have very definite 
bearings on plan implementation processes. Foreign exchange shortages 
occur, leading to capital import constraints; capital goods prices rise 
over budgeted levels; crop failures and famine call for the diversion of 
investment funds into consumption. In yet other instances, political and 
social upheavals lead to critical shortages, in specialised manpower. 
Although various approaches in statistical decision-making and 
game theory have attempted to deal with the issue of decision making 
under uncertainty, the proponents of these strategies generally agree 
on their inapplicability to complex, collective policy choices. It is 
not easy to apply the solutions from welfare economics either. The 
problems of applying a normative theory of dollective choice are well 
k n o w n . T h e fact, then, is that development projects' implementation 
processes cannot be comprehended under such theoretical frameworks. 
The paucity of accurate information on the causal relationship between 
policy initiation and project output leads to decisions which are made 
with partial information. Project goals and strategies then crystallize 
in the light of additional knowledge and experience. Alternatively, 
this kind of uncertainty might be countered by fr?,gmenting the problem 
into parts which can be adequately handled by sub-organizations. The 
incidence of environment uncertainty dictates that organizations desist 
from long range commitments or plans into a future they cannot sufficiently 
decipher. Further, it also dictates that goals and procedures be con-
stantly adapted to suit circumstances. Lastly, it calls for slack or spare 
resources to cope with unexpected demands and for the duplication of parts 
or functions which can substitute for ea„ch other in the event of unfore-
seen problems. Program implementation under uncertainty is therefore a 
11. An excellent summary is given by Richard Zeckhauser and Elmer Shaeffer, 
"Public Policy and normative Economic Theory" in R.A. 3auer and K.J. 
Gergen (eds) The Study of Policy Formation (New York, The Free Press 
1 9 6 8 ) pp 2 7 - 1 0 1 . 
access of p.rip.rit,i.ve our. Indeed the only pertinent issue is the 
12 
optimum le'"el of the foregoing administrative aberrations. Any insistence 
thai; plan implementation processes follow once-and-for-all, standardised, 
systematic procedures is, under prevailing circumstances, a blueprint for 
disasters 
THE KEHYAH EXPERIENCE. 
The inevitability of the eclectic, pragmatic and seemingly disor-1 r .0.; 
style of policy formation and execution, which we have already alluded to, 
is exemplified by Kenya's experience in development programmes' implement-
ation over the last decade. Ho attempt is made to a,ssert that the Konyar 
experience is ideal, but it serves to highlight the pervasiveness of the 
development administration behaviour which we have already indicated and 
which is typical of most underdeveloped countries. 
One area in which such administrative phenomena can be observed is 
that of development project financing and execution. For, although the 
ability of the development administration agencies to fully utilize 
annual development appropriations is oftej seen as an imperative for successfu 
plan implementation, a host of factors typically intervene rendering it 
impossible to execute the projects in time or as initially envisaged. 
Government reports abound with instances of delays in foreign aid nego-
tiations. And even where aid is procured in time, delays are experienced 
in the detailed preparation of project design or in the redesigning of 
earlier plans on account of new knowledge or donor insistence. More 
importantly, uncertainties in the construction industry seriously affect 
the pace of public capita,! formation. In the wake of Independence and 
the government's Africanisation policies, many non-citizen firms producing 
building materials• xround up and many building artisans left the country
0 
The result has been a rapid rise in material and labour prices. Betweer 
1566 and l?68j for instance, the price of sand rose by a phenomenrl 57/*° 
Between I96
0
 and 1973» "the price, increases were as high at 39$ for sand 
and 10$ for unskilled labour. This of course means that even where 
12. I can think of no better parallel. to this than Albert 0. -^r ^'s 
"Model of optimum disorderliness". in connection .with the inevitable 
imbalances in national investment strategies. See his article, "The 
Strategy of Economic Development" in A.II. Agarwala and S.P* Singh 
ids ) c ilgcrating Investment in Developing Courntries (London, 
Oxford University Press, 1969) p. 5. 
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p/lmin-ir*+—ve capacity to execute projects existed, the initial project 
appropriations would purchase only a portion of the assets originally 
planned for, The delays in aid negotiations, proje vt design and bottle-
necks in construction manifest themselves in persistent shortfalls 
betxijeen approved estimates and actual expenditures. The proportion of 
unutilized development funds ranges from 111* for the 1968/69 financial 
year to 25f for 1966/67. All these magnitudes exemplify the problem 
of a poorly staffed public bureaucracy attempting to cope with a swiftly 
changing situation. 
The other major shortcoming with regard to the project financing 
process is the failure to take account of the future operating expenses 
of capital projects. Peter S. Heller highlights this in a detailed study 
of the problem in K e n y a . G i v e n the probable rates of growth in national 
income, recurrent expenditure and government revenue, Heller's study demon-
strates that recurrent revenues in future are bound to fall short of the 
required levels of operating expenses, should the present pace of public 
capital formation in Kenya continue. This will inevitably result in 
progressive deterioration of government services in the form of medicine 
shortages in hospitals, unrepaired roads, schools without teachers, etc. 
To these ^tural increases in recurrent expenditure one must add the 
occasional commitments which cannot be accurately foreseen. Thus the 
deterioration of local government services led to the takeover of the 
functions relating to education, health and roads by the central govern-
ment in 1970. This prompted increases in recurrent expenditure to the 
tune of £1,3 million for health and £7=7 million for education between 
the financial year 1969/70 and 1970/71 alone. The: All African Trade 
13, Provisional statistics for the financial years 1971/72 and 
1972/73 show modest overexpenditures (5$ and 3a respectively) 
on development expenditure. In real terms, however, the 
figures show net underexpenditure. 
14„ Peter S. Keller
s
 "Th^.Dynamics of Project Expenditure and che 
Planning process w5th reference to Kenya" (Harvard University 
PhD thesis, 1971). The general nature of the problem is 
discussed by Albert Wat erst"- in Development P"
1
 - ••ir.i::..: (T3" Itinera, 
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), pp 224-26. 
Pair held in Nairobi in 1972 called for public expenditures worth £154j000• 
For the current year (1973) £271,451 'Mb been set aside for the 
purpose of the 10th independence celebrations. None of these events is 
foreseen in the development plans for the respective years. In fact, 
the financial provisions for both the natural and occasional operating 
expenses are formulated as the problems arise
s
 on an ad hoc, year-to-
year contingency basis. That of course is why with every budget (and 
throughout the year too) changes in tax rates, or the introduction of 
new taxes can never be ruled out. And in spite of this approach the 
government has managed t o fully finance its recurrent expenses sine.: 
1967 and to accumulate modest recurrent surpluses which from 1970-1973 
amount to £42 million — almost one-third of the period's development 
expenditure. 
Policy vacillations are also evident in the way economic 
decisions are made to placate interest groups. The regime is obliged 
15 
to the "comprador" alliance: the privileged stratum of society com-
prising the public bureaucracy, progressive farmers, the petty 
bourgeoisie and the social annex of the foreign capitalist enclave. 
In addition, political and economic bargains must be struck xfith those 
ethnic groups and regions to whom the regime feels politically indebted. 
The precise nature of the activities which arise from this kind of 
arrangement cannot be predicted accurately enough to be included in a 
systematic sequence of actions. Thus both the Tripartite Agreements 
of 1964 and 1970, requiring arbitrary increases in the labour 
force, were meant to mollify the unemployed. None of them were included 
in the development plans for the respective periods, the second agree-
ment being announced barely six months after the 1970-74 plan was 
initiated. So too, we now witness the abolition of the Graduated 
Personal Tax (GPT) on account of mounting taxpayer discontent anc* the 
15. The phase is Paul Baran's as in his Political Economy of Growth 
(New York, Monthly Review Press, 1957TI 
provincial administrations' reservations about collecting this unpopular 
This same style of problem solving is apparent in the government's 
attempts to conciliate the African bourgeoisie. The 19^7 Trade Licensing 
and Immigration Acts, basically intended to accelerate the Africanisation 
of commerce, were formulated with minimum consultation with government 
planners or the private sector, both of whom would almost certainly have 
17 
opposed the measures. In fact, the implementation mechanisms of these 
acts were not immediately clear. They were worked out in the light of 
experience. Again with regard to the remunerations in the bureaucracy, 
the Ndegwa Commission recommended across-the-board salary increases 
ranging from a whopping 50$ raise for some of the top grades to 10$ 
for others. The result - a hitherto unplanned-for £14 million (or 
15$) increase in recurrent expenditure from 1969/70 to 1970/71. The 
motivation for the massive increase, candidly given by the Commission, 
is that the government could not afford not to pay as this would disappoint 18 
the civil service. Of some importance in this connection is the fact 
that the government had previously committed itself, albeit vaguely, to 
instituting an incomes policy in the interests of equity and increased 
employment. 
Lastly, in connection with interest group appeasement, special 
mention must be made of the unforeseeable policy changes which can be 
made by unchallengable Presidential fiat. The leadership style of 
President Kenyatta consists of hosting various local delegations in 
an informal atmosphere. This has become an excellent venue to seek 
the repeal of policies inimical to the economic interests of the groups 
in question or for seeking new favourable decrees. In this fashion we 
16. Note, contrary to this, that the 1970/74 plan forecasts that 
"the methods of assessing the Graduated Personal Tax will be 
improved so that the tax yield at existing rates is increased". 
Republic of Kenya, Development Plan 1970/74(Nairobi, Government 
Printer, I969) p. 5. 
17c See Edgar Edwards, "Development Planning in Kenya since Independence" 
East African Economic Review Vol. 4 (ITS) N O . 2 I 9 6 8 , p. 10. Edwards 
was the government's planning adviser. 
18. Report on the Commission of Inquiry op.cit. p.49* 
19. Development Plan 1970/74 op.cit. pp. 135-136 where the government 
proposes "a firmer grip over public seotrvr wages and salaries" and 
/ . \ ~ .. J. 1 .1 - J>J> »- ^  1 « tl 
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v>ave witnessed the raising of producer milk prices leading to the 
conversion of some cash crop acreage into grazing pasture aid to 
financial atrophy on the part of the Kenya Go-operative Creameries. 
In yet other instances the prices paid to wheat and pyrethrum 
farmers have been increased (with apparent economic justification in 
the case of wheat) although the current development plan's agricultural 
pricing policy favours the scaling down of the prices paid to pyrethrum , 
20 
maize and wheat farmers. Other policy changes might entail considerable 
revenue loss to the Treasury, as witness the recent repeal of the 
traditional liquor tax at the behest of the "brewers, leading to a 
£350,000 revenue loss to the exchequer or the 1973/74 financial year 
21 
alone. The adaptive mechanism to stich a revenue shortage manifests 
itself in delayed or cut project funds. Such problems therefore stem 
from the nature of system politics and cannot be solved by a series 
of attractive programme charts drawn from a computer. This perhaps 
explains the strong tendency of system innovators to concentrate on 
rural planning which is (deceptively) free from central government 
power politics. 
Rural plan implemention procedures, such as PIM, count heavily 
upon co-operation between provincial administration and the field 
officers of the executive ministries, notably agriculture, veterinary, 
social services and public works. Its linchpin is the co-ordination 
of these diverse agencies. However, there is little certainty that 
such co-operation will be automatically forthcoming. On the contrary, 
rural development administration in Kenya is characterised by the 
autonomy and independence of provincial administration coupled with 
strong "departmentalism" among the technical deparments. Imposing 
an Area Co- rdinator (AC) without formal power on this structure for 
the purposes of instituting systems procedures is wishful thinking at 
best. Cherry Gertzel provides an excellent factual account of the 
20. Ibid, p. 197-8. 
21, East African Standard 25th July, 1973. 
provincial ..'ministration's stror.^ capacity to resist directives from the 
Ministry of Economic Planning and t o implement programmes at its o\-h 
22 
autonomous tempo, a fact underscored by one Provincial Commission':by 
his recent criticism of "vague and bulky professional literature" produc 
by planners in Nairobi. Local interest, in his vie::, -7as on "factual 23 
ploysical projects." These inter-departmental cleavages lead to fragmen 
tary efforts and duplication of functions. To make these departments 
conf"^. to a sti ndardised code of administrative behaviour would require 
a dose of coercive power which the government is obviously unwilling to 
expend, not a two-week training course in filling out multicolored pro-
gramme charts for a few co-ordinators. This is why, in spite of their 
pious homage to PIM, Chabala, Kiiru and Mukuna still report problems of 
non-cooperation, delays in the relea.se of funds, ritualistic observation 
of procedures, and the weakness of the ACs.^'
+
 — all symptomatic of the 
"disorderly" administrative behaviour whose pervasiveness we have been 
trying to demonstrate. 
The other important facet of rural development is that of self-
help or "Harambee" schemes. With regard to these, the LPP (Local 
Participation Procedures) programme has been designed by Belshaw and 
Chambers. PIM to some extent is also concerned with programming local 
self-help effort. Yet this is the area which is least amenable to 
systematised procedures. How does one programme the implementation of 
self-help projects with local leadership whose control of the partici-
pants is tenuous and who could be trounced out of office by the local 
political boss? Furthermore, schisms from within self-help movements 
are commonplace, leading to project delay or stoppage. This is partly 
because, for local political leadership, self-help projects constitute 
a leeway for consolidating local political support. The exact nature 
22. Cherry Gertzel, "Provincial Administration and Development in Kenya 
paper delivered at the Universities Social Science Conference, 
Dar es Salaam, 1970. 
23. East African Standard 2nd August, 1973. 
240 E, Chabala, D. Kiiru & S. Mukuna, A Further Evaluation of the PIM 
System (Nairobi, Institute for Development Studies, Working Paper 
Ho. 119). 
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of "the resulting political interplay is very difficult to anticipate. 
In fact net only do we not know how much capital inver tment goes into 
self-help activities but it has proved very difficult to anticipate 
which direction the general movement will take. Prom the immediate 
post-independence enthusiasm for secondary schools, self help effort 
has diverged into hospitals, cattle dips, water supply and, of late, 
the "Harambee" Institiites of Technology. The institutes, begun around 
mid-1971, are hardly mentioned in 1970/74 plan. Self-help projects 
themselves generate further economic distortions in the form of un-
employable school leavers and additional financing of recurrent ex-
penses for schools and hospitals. 
Since self-help projects are prompted partly by local popular 
enthusiasm and partly by the political leaders themselves, to programme 
them in such a way that they conform to a plan would require some form 
of political regimentation,, The opportunity cost would be the loss of 
political support to the regime. It is a cost few governments would 
wish to incur. In the frank words of Labour Minister, ITgala Mwendwa 
on harambee schools: 
"It is hard to close Harambee schools and reduce their 
production.... - they are a political thina..... and even 
though I am not very happy with what they are doing I myself 
am building these schools •••• - this is political and 
cannot be helped." 
Thus, as intimated earlier, the authorities resort to adaptive mechanisms. 
The result is phased, sequential and selective takeover of the running 
of Harambee schools and health centres, and this is as subject to politi-
cal pressures as the self-help projects themselves. 
The vulnerability of systems analysis in plan implementation 
becomes obvious when one considers the many unpredictable aspects of 
foreign economic assistance. Foreign aid financed 100> of the Kenya 
25. The Sunday 'Nation, October 29th, 1972. 
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development budget for 19&4»
 a
 figure whioh has since dropped to 49$ 
for 1973/74 financial year. The experience has been one in which 
levels of aid are influenced by the donor's balance of payments 
position and domestic politics. In addition, the effectiveness of 
foreign aid in promoting local goals is strongly undermined by the 
26 
fact that donors often promote their own sector and project priorities. 
The situation is not very different for multilateral agencies either. 
The World Bank group is well known for advocating and. executing projects 27 
which they feel the recipient country could benefit from. The 
tendency of the United Nations Development Programme to promote its 
version of development projects and the competition between various 
UN agencies in East Africa is well documented by Susan Aurelia Gitelson .' 
The alternatives left to the implementing agencies are either to dispense 
with aid, a, move which is highly unlikely, or to adjust to this helter-
skelter situation. A definite, systematic programme of implementation 
could be adhered to only if the donor governments and multilateral 
agencies were made to conform to some grand international plan — a re-
mote possibility, to say the least. 
TEE RATIONALE OP "DISCRDERLINESS". 
What then is the rationale underlying the observed administrative 
phenomena? The problems of instituting a systems management framework 
for plan implementation, which we have already outlined, originate from 
the fact that the administrative organisations in question are "open" 
systems operating in the context of internal changes and environmental 
intrusions. Any hypotheses concerning the appropriate strategies for 
implementation under such circumstances must therefore begin from an 
understanding of administrative behaviour of open complex organisations
0 
The effectiveness and efficiency of such organisations, Banard tells us 
in his celebrated book on administration, is predicated on the admini-
strative capacity to establish an equilibrium between, on the one hand, 
26. The ILO Report op.cit. pp 575077. 
27. An authoritative statement to this effect can be found in "The 
Project Cycle" Finance and Development, June 1970. 
28c Susan Aurelia Gitelson, "Multilateral Aid" East Africa Journal 
Vol
e
8 No. 2(l97l) and "How are development projects selected; 
the case of UNDP in Uganda and Tanzania". The AfVinnn Boiriow 
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internal organisational demands and, on the other hand, the external 
29 
problemso In the context under discussion here, this means that the 
plan implementation machinery must cope with problems of incomplete 
information, changing internal demands as well as the realities of 
external uncertainty
0 
One of the most persistent internal organisational problems 
pertains to decision—making with imprecise knowledge of the develop-
ment process as already outlined. Furthermore, planning must proceed 
in the absence of considerable factual data; "without facts" to use 
Stolper's famous phra.se. Not only are market prices distorted, 
rendering the use of "shadow prices" in project appraise* difficult, 
but topographical, hydrological, agronomic biological data 
are often either lacking or incomplete. Yet systems planning re; .ires 
such information so that project inputs and the exact process of con-
verting them into the desired goals can be accurately programmed. In 
the absence of complete information, however, the implementing 
agencies are more likely to resort to Simon's "satisficing" behaviour; 
to seek satisfactory alternatives as opposed to these which unambi-
guously maximise given project goals, In fact, from -n economics of 
information standpoint, information gathering must not proceed beyond 
the point where marginal cost is equated with marginal benefits. This 
means, as Stigler counsels, that we must be content to operate with 
varying levels of optimal i g n o r a n c e , L i k e the project manager 
of the Kiambu Institute of Technology, who admitted frankly that his 
team did not know exac ly .what an "institute of technology" was supposed 
32 
to do, most implementing agencies proceed with considerable ignorance 
29, Chester I Barnard, Jhe Functions of the Executive (Harvard 
University Press, 1938) pp 82-3. 
30, Herbert A
0
 Simon, Administrative Behaviour (Hew York, The Free 
Press, 1965)0 
31« George J. Stigler, "The Economics of Information" Journr1 of Political 
Economy 69; 3rd June I96I p. 224. 
32. The Daily Nation, July 3rd, 1973. 
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and imperfect information. In fact, Olive Gray has asserted that it 
would take, for most projects, "detailed feasibility studies lasting up 
to a decade before anyone can predict within a 5® per cent margin of 
error whether the benefit-cost ratio will be positive or, negative. 
The pertinent issue then, it seems to me, is not to clamour for "detailed 
feasibility and economic" studies but to delineate the optimal ignorance 
a project can operate with. Chambers himself provides a detailed 
success story of the Mwea Irrigation Scheme which began under circum-
stances of almost unbelievable ignoiaice on physical, technical and 
economic aspects. It goes to show that inadequate pre-planning 
need not be the paramount precursor of faulty implementation it is 
always supposed to be. A lot depends on post planning activities. 
The other strategy which organisations utilize to counter the 
pervasiveness of incomplete information, therefore, is to leave goals 
and strategies vague and to clarify them in a series of successive 
policy decisions in the light of post-planning realities. A variant 
of this strategy is the incremental adjustment of social overhead 
capital to directly productive activities (or vice versa), outlined 
35 
by Hirschman. This same approach is observable with regard to the 
sequential adjustments of current expenditure to additional social 
infrastructures; the "financial myopia" which Heller so vehemently 
denounces. This approach is given a theoretical underpinning by Tibor 
ScItovsky in his now famous analysis of pecuniary externalities. 
33. Clive So Cray, "Development Planning in East Africa", Bast 
African Economic Review Vol.2 (NS) no.2 1966. p.6. Gray's 
experience is derived from his work as a planner in the 
Kenya government. 
34, Robert Chambers, Settlement Schemes in Tropical Africa. (New 
York, Fraeger, 1969) pp 43-136. 
35° A.O., Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (Yale 
University Press, I958) pp 86-89. 
36. ^ibor Scitovsky, "Two Concepts of External Economies" in A.N. 
Agarwala and S.P. Singh (eds) The Economics of TT-nrie-rvevelopment 
(New York, Oxford University Press, 1965) P 295-308 
- 16 -
Under his scheme, additional investment in industry A will cheapen A's 
product, causing the profits of those industries using A's products as 
inputs to rise. These profits call for expansion in those industries, 
which in turn calls for expansion and investment in A. Thus, in a series 
of see-saw activities this process is carried on until an equilibrium is 
reached. The incremental adjustment of road services to the expansion 
of tourist services and various cash crops in Kenya demonstrates the 
practical nature of this strate.-y. Admittedly, the strategy can be 
misused, leading to bot
+
'
1
 "-"^cks and unutilized capacity, and it may be 
completely impractical for most w ber-resource investments which are not 
vej.^  ameiable to construction by stages. The acid test of sensible-
development administration, however, is the ability to spot such differences 
and to react in time to investment activities in complementary organisa-
tions which cannot be firmly programmed due to a host of unknowns and 
recurring uncertainty. 
Should the above techniques to counter insufficient information 
prove unsatisfactory, the administrative organisation in (question feels 
bottnd to fragment the policy problem into subproblems which can then be 
handled by specialised subparts of the organisation. Bernard Schaffor 
contends that decentralized bureaucracy with a latitude for departmental 
autonomy is better suited for development administration than the centra— 
37 
lized, monolithic Weberian ideal type. The situations which we have 
described here show why his argument makes so much sense. Again the 
process may be carried too far; so much so that departmental goals 
supercede overall intentions or even replace them. Indeed it is this 
excess behaviour which gives rise to the perennial complaints about 
un-co-ordinated activities and inefficiency; the inadequacies which 
systems planning now claims it will rectify by on-the-spot, organisa-
tion-wide, information network. These complaints, however, must be 
balanced against the fact that most innovation within organisations 
originates precisely from these goal and prouedui al deflections by the 
37° Bernard Schaffer, "Deadlock in Development Administration" in 
Colin T. Leys (ed) Politics and Change in Devol o~.irif Country^; 
(London, Cambridge University Press, 1969) PP 177-211. 
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38 
departments, For as long as we live in a world of uncertainties, then, 
policy fragmentation is bound to occur and reform must be geared, not so 
much to eliminating it as to keeping it within reasonable bounds. 
The essentiality of policy fragmentation during the implementation 
process is enhanced all the more by the ever present need to resolve 
latent or oA-oual conflict among participating groups and members. The 
conflict avoidance tactics which come into play in such contexts are well 
known to political scientists and students of business organisation: 
strong departments are permitted some goal autonomy; the subgoals of 
participating members are attended to sequentially; lastly, and most 
importantly, attempts to make overall goals too specific are sidestepped 
as this would inevitably produce debate and dissension from among orga-
nisational ranks. This explains the already noted tendencies for donors, 
the political leadership, the Provincial Administration and other agencies 
to develop their own goals even within the same development programme 
and perpetual complaints from most planners and policy analysts that 
policy makers fail to express, iheir aims in specific and, preferably
8 
quantifiable terms. To make sense, however, such complaints must be 
balanced against the degree of intra-organisational conflict which vary-
ing levels of goal specification and departmental autonomy will engender; 
for project management of whatever kind involves delicate lalancing of 
goal setting strategy on the one hand and internal conflict resolution 
on the other. 
The plan implementation proccss as an open system m a t not only 
contend with such internal problems but also the vagaries of external 
uncertainty delineated earlier. The most potent organisational instrument 
38a The point is made by Jarnes Q. Wilson that diveisi
L
y of procedures 
within complex organizations increases the probability of innovation 
in "Innovation in Organization: ITotes Toward a Theory" in J.Do 
Thompson (ed) Approaches to Organisational Desiayis. (Pittsburgh 
University Press, 1966) pp 193-218. Note also the "sequential 
implementation procedure" at Kwale which the SRDP evaluation 
team found such a. useful, replicable innovation but which was a 
deviation from centrally outlined SRDP procedures in An Overall 
Evaluation of the SRDP, op.cit. pp.35-6. 
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•to combat uncertainty and thus ensure reliability, Landau tells us in a 
seminal paper, is redundancy.^ It sounds paradoxical since redundancy 
is often associated with excess and waste, However, to enhance reliability, 
redundancy and duplication are extensively used in languages, natural 
automata and computer technology. The increasing use of dual br:Icing 
systems, spare tiros, and a host of additional safety factors to in-
crease safety in automobile driving is something we are all witness to« 
And in the domain of complex formal organisations we know that those 
agencies whose missions are most uncertainty-bound, such as fire depart-
ments, ambulance services and emergency hospitals and the police, have 
to operate overtime, often on a 24 hour basis. Thus they require spare 
or redundant resources at the ready in order to cope with unpredictable 
emergencies. Indeed, this is the underlying reason for some of the much 
lamented unspent budgetary appropriations; resources are kept redundant 
so that attractive projects can be snapped up whenever they arise and 
to satisfy the periodic, unpredictable political demands of the varieties 
outlined earlier. The Kenya Ministry of Works budgeted £3 million for 
unforese eableconstruction during the period 1969/70 to 1973/74 and the 
last two Kenya development plans advocate, with the benefit of hindsight, 
that development expenditures for each ministry should be set higher than 
40 
anticipated actual spending — a method of introducing redundancy,, 
Complementary to the use of redundancy is the use of duplication 
and overlap. Organizations ensure reliability by creating several 
mechanisms which can substitute for each other should one fail. Thus 
education in Kenya is not just a function of the Ministry of Education; 
Agriculture, Health, Community Development, Co-operatives, overseas 
and voluntary agencies all play important roles. It is the kind of 
duplication and overlap of departmental functions which PPBS is 
41 pledged to eliminate. Yet even Chambers himself recognises the 
39« Martin Landau, "Redundancy, Rationality and the Problem of Duplica-
tion and Overlap" Public Administration Review (Vol.29 No.4) 
1969 pp 346-58. 
40. Republic of Kenya, Development Plan I966/7O Nairobi, Government 
Printer, I966) p.119 and Development Plan 1970/74 p. 385. 
41. See for instance Melvin Ashen, "The Program Budget in Operation" 
in David Novick (ed) Programme Budgeting (Harvard University 
Press, I965) P»359 for one such example. 
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positive aspects of certain forms of functional overlap in settlement 
42 
scheme activity. In the course of the SRDP it was established that 
the effective Area Co-ordinators relied on diplomatic, informal 
contacts and persuasion; or, put differently, on their ability to 
exploit duplicate channels of communication,, Similarly, the much 
advertised benefits of Research and Development strategy (R & D) 
actually derive from judicious use of duplication and from the type 
of goal and process flexibility we have already been advocating.^ 
But should such uncertainty-combating strategies prove unsatis-
factory, the implementing departments can then resort to uncertainty 
avoidance tactics — hence the political machinations to fix agricultural 
prices, lower taxes for certain producers and reach agreements on t.ome 
inputs and wages« The basic purpose is to increase joint incomes or 
profits collectively. Economists will recognize strong similarities 
between this and the cartel: price rigidity behaviour in oligopoly 
market structure, a situation of differentiated output, uncertain 
market demand curves and indeterminate reaction of one's competitors 
— all similar to the problems that confront government agencies discussed 
earlier
0 
Development policy making, th.n,whether at macro, project or 
implementation level is therefore more likely to succeed through tactful 
and judicious use of the unorthodox processes delineated here. And 
this is nothing more than an elaborated restatement of the challenges 
many practical policy makers pose against the conventional optimising 
prescriptions. It therefore concurs with W. Arthur lewis' perceptive 
42o Robert Chambers, Settlement Schemes in Tropical Africa op.cit. p 207<> 
43® In this connection it should be made quite clear that the R & D 
approach for rural development in Kenya, advocated in several of 
the studies cited here, is misconstrued. The success of R & D 
in American defence and industry has typically relied on flexible 
designations of the desired product, adjustable goal attainment 
strategies and duplication of experiments. See RoR. Nelson, 
"The Efficient Achievement of Rapid Technological Progress"
5 
American Economic Review Vol. 56 No. 2 1966. pp 232-241„ The 
utility of this approach in economic development is suggested by 
A.O. Hirschman in Development Projects Observed (Washington, The 
Brookings Institution 1967) PP- 75-81° 
warning against designing macro-economic plans on rigid "scientific" 
principles, and of the need to approach the whole issue with caution 
44 
and flexibilityo Indeed, the reputed World Bank project implementation 
depends not so much on formal analysis and procedures as on the judge-
ments of those with experience in many projects, under varying conditions 
and on their ability to deal with unquantifiable, changing project 45 
characteristics. It is precisely this kind of sheer organisational wit 
to skirt around ignorance and internal conflicts and to use redundancy 
and duplication at their optimum levels, that is being advocated here. 
C R I T I C I S M S O F T H E S T R A T E G Y . 
Critics will unhesitatingly point out that this approach 
emphasizes organizational effectiveness to the neglect of efficient 
resource use and much needed co-ordination. The kind of efficiency 
economists advocate in this context is the allocative efficiency of 
the market variety and hence the use of shadow prices in public project 
appraisal. Yet, even ignoring the prevalent market imperfections, this 
ignores other kinds of efficiency. Harvey Leibenstein has brilliantly 
demonstrated the superiority of " X-efficiency" in the creation of 
additional firm output. "X-efficiency" is derived from sources some-
what similar to the techniques advanced here: internal motivation, use 
of non—market inputs and the ability to react accordingly to external 
46 
conditions principally in the form of competition. Prom an entirely 
different approach Albert Hirschman has shown that the unprogrammed, 
unbalanced, "cart-before-the horse" techniques can sometimes be more 47 efficient than programmed co-ordinated sequences.' 
44o Wo Arthur Lewis, "On Assessing a Development Plan" in I. Livingston 
(ed) Economic Policy for Development (Penguin Books, 197l) P° 405-17 
45® John A. King (ed) Economic Development Projects and their Appraisal, 
(Baitimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1967) pp. 5-8, 
46. Harvey Leibenstein, "Allocative Efficiency vs "X-efficiency" 
American Economic Revie;^ Vol. 56 No. 3, 1966 pp 392-415. 
47o The Strategy of Economic Development op.cit. pp 77-83. 
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Jhe more potent criticism however is that of the apparent 
absence of co-ordination, the more so because "co-ordination
1
' has 
become the standard, commonplace induction whenever project imple-
mentation goes x^rongo Co—ordination means effecting co-operation 
among diverse participants to achieve common goals. This entails 
the use of information, threats, incentives and, as a last resort, 
coercion. This is the stuff every managerial or administrative 
job is made of
0
 In this context, co-ordination is nothing more than 
48 
a synonym for the entire administrative process
0
 It is an admonition 
to initiate better implementation procedures without specifying which 
ones and to what extent. As such, it is merely a statement of the 
problem at hand! successful implementation requires improved admin -
strative processes. I is certainly one of the great recurring 
tautologies in the development literature<> 
CONCLUSION. 
The various techniques in systems management now being purveyed 
in the African countries for improved plan implementation are only 
practicable in situations where the environment is fully desdribed and 
policy-outcome relationship is unequivocal. All that one needs, 
then, is to follow the delineated code of standard procedures undeviatingly 
to achieve the desired objectives. There is probably not a single 
development project which would fit this scheme. '-'-'hat of course is 
why the team of social scientists who compiled the SRDP "functional 
model" for project implementation had to resort to such naive examples 
as football and hockey to legitimize the adoption of their uniform 
principles, strategies and objectives for the entire programme. We 
need not stress that systems management itself derives considerable 
inspiration and rationale from systems engineering. Unlike most 
development programmes, however, these are situations in which the 
probability distribution of outcomes is known. 
Rendering advice to tL poor (and especially the Africans) has 
become a thriving industry, particularly when such advice is couched 
48
0
 In what has been called an exe apiary definition, Banard defines 
formal organisation as "a b,/otem of Consciously co-orc.—iated 
activities or forces of two or more persons" in The Functions 
of the Executive op. cit. p. 73 (emphasis, mine). 
in quasi-scientific jargon. Although there may be instances when 
such advice might prove valuable, the inclination of this paper is 
that systems management is one innovation the development administra-
tion process could safely do without in Kenya and indeed in the rest 
of Africa. 
